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This paper proposes a uniﬁed framework that integrates the traditional index-based
approach and the competing non-cooperative approach to power analysis. It rests
on a quantiﬁable notion of ex post power as the (counterfactual) sensitivity of the
expected or observed outcome to individual players. Thus, it formalizes players’
marginal impact on outcomes in both cooperative and non-cooperative games, for
both strategic interaction as well as purely random behavior. By taking expectations
with respect to preferences, actions, and procedures one obtains meaningful measures
of ex ante power. Established power indices turn out to be special cases.
Keywords: Power indices, spatial voting, equilibrium analysis, decision procedures1 Introduction
Scientists who study power in political and economic institutions seem divided into two
disjoint methodological camps. The ﬁrst one uses non-cooperative game theory to analyze
the impact of explicit decision procedures and given preferences over a well-deﬁned – usually
Euclidean – policy space.1 The second one stands in the tradition of cooperative game
theory with much more abstractly deﬁned voting bodies: The considered agents have no
particular preferences and form winning coalitions which implement unspeciﬁed policies.
Individual chances of being part of and inﬂuencing a winning coalition are then measured
by a power index.2
Proponents of either approach have recently intensiﬁed their debate in the context of
decision-making in the European Union (EU).3 The non-cooperative camp’s verdict is that
“power indices exclude variables that ought to be in a political analysis (institutions and
strategies) and include variables that ought to be left out (computational formulas and
hidden assumptions)” (Garrett and Tsebelis, 1999a, p. 337). The cooperative camp has
responded by clarifying the assumptions underlying its power formulas and giving some
reasons for not making institutions and strategies – corresponding to decision procedures
and rational preference-driven agents – more explicit.4 There also have been some attempts
to include actors’ preferences in the cooperative approach.5
Several authors have concluded that it is time to develop a uniﬁed framework for mea-
1See e.g. Steunenberg (1994), Tsebelis (1994, 1996), Crombez (1996, 1997), and Moser (1996, 1997).
2See e.g. Brams and Aﬀuso (1985a, 1985b), Widgr´ en (1994), Hosli (1993), Laruelle and Widgr´ en (1998),
Baldwin et al. (2000, 2001), Felsenthal and Machover (2001b), and Leech (2002) for recent applications
of traditional power indices. Felsenthal and Machover (1998) and Nurmi (1998) contain a more general
discussion regarding index-based analysis of power.
3Cf. the contributions to the symposium in Journal of Theoretical Politics 11(3), 1999, together with
Tsebelis and Garrett (1997), Dowding (2000), Garrett and Tsebelis (2001), and Felsenthal and Machover
(2001a).
4See, in particular, Holler and Widgr´ en (1999), Berg and Lane (1999), Felsenthal and Machover (2001a),
and Braham and Holler (2002).
5See e.g. Straﬃn (1977, 1988), Widgr´ en (1995), Kirman and Widgr´ en (1995), and Hosli (2002).
1suring decision power (cf. Steunenberg et al., 1999, and Felsenthal and Machover, 2001a).6
On the one hand, such a framework should allow for predictions and ex post analysis of
decisions based on knowledge of procedures and preferences. On the other hand, it must be
open to ex ante and even completely a priori7 analysis of power when detailed information
may either not be available or should be ignored for normative reasons. Unfortunately, the
ﬁrst attempt to provide such a framework, by Steunenberg et al. (1999), is problematic.8
It confounds power and the success that may, but need not, result from it. This paper
proposes an alternative framework.
In particular, we generalize the concept of a player’s marginal impact or marginal
contribution to a collective decision in order to establish a common (ex post) primitive
of power for cooperative and non-cooperative analysis. Its evaluation amounts to the
comparison of an actual outcome with a counterfactual shadow outcome which alternatively
could have been brought about by the considered player. That is we look at the sensitivity
of a given outcome to the considered player’s behavior. In our view, sensitivity analysis of
outcomes goes a long way towards a reconciliation of equilibrium-based non-cooperative
measurement and winning coalition-based traditional power indices. One can transparently
measure ex ante power as a player’s expected ex post power. This is in line with the
probabilistic interpretation of traditional power indices (cf. Owen, 1972, 1995 and Straﬃn,
6Gul (1989) and Hart and MasColell (1996) already give non-cooperative foundations for the Shapley
value and thus indirectly the Shapley-Shubik index.
7There has been controversy at several workshops on power analysis about the correct usage of the
terms ‘a priori’ and ‘a posteriori’. We use the term ‘ex ante’ to mean ‘before a decision is singled out
or taken’ and the term ‘ex post’ to mean ‘for a particular expected or observed decision’. We reserve ‘a
priori’ to the complete ignorance about any aspect of decision-making other than – somewhat arbitrarily –
voting weights and quota. Note that this deﬁnition makes meaningful ex ante or ex post analysis of real
institutions for which more information than weights and quota – e.g. the strategic resources awarded to
players by a particular agenda-setting or multi-stage voting procedure – is known and relevant necessarily
‘a posteriori’.
8Partly in response to Widgr´ en and Napel (2002) and an earlier version of this paper, Steunenberg and
Schmidtchen have suggested modiﬁcations of their framework that promise to signiﬁcantly improve it at
the LSE Workshop on Voting Power Analysis, 2002.
21977, 1978, 1988; Laruelle and Valenciano, 2002, provide an up-to-date discussion and
extensions). Expectation is to be taken with respect to an appropriate probability measure
on the power-relevant states of the world.
The proposed framework is ﬂexible and allows for diﬀerent ‘degrees of a priori-ness’, con-
cerning players’ either purely random or preference-based actions as well as details about
decision procedures. Only inclusion of the latter allows to capture the power implications
of resources other than pure voting weight – players’ procedural and strategic resources.
Traditional (ex ante) power indices, such as the Penrose index or Shapley-Shubik index,
are obtained as special cases.
The index approach to power analysis has evolved signiﬁcantly in the last 50 years.
It has reached a point where its integration into a framework that also allows for explicit
decision procedures and preference-driven strategic behavior seems a natural step. We ﬁrst
give a short overview of the index approach in section 2, which takes up some arguments
from the fundamental critique of index-based studies by Garrett and Tsebelis. The creative
response by Steunenberg et al. to the latter is sketched and brieﬂy discussed in section 3.
The main section 4 then lays out our uniﬁed framework. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Traditional Power Index Approach
The traditional object of studies of decision power has been a weighted voting game charac-
terized by a set of players, N = f1;:::;ng, a voting weight for each player, wi ¸ 0 (i 2 N),
and a minimal quota of weights, k > 0, that is needed for the passage of a legislative
proposal. Subsets of players, S µ N, are called coalitions. If a coalition S meets the quota,
i.e.
P
i2S wi ¸ k, it is a winning coalition. Formation of a winning coalition is assumed to
be desirable to its members. More generally, a winning coalition need not be determined
by voting weights. One can conveniently describe an abstract decision body v by directly
stating either the set W(v) of all its winning coalitions or its subset of minimal winning
coalitions, M(v).9 The latter contains only those winning coalitions which are turned into
3a losing coalition if one of its members leaves the coalition. An equivalent representation
is obtained by taking v to be a mapping from the set of all possible coalitions, }(N), to
f0;1g, where v(S) = 1 (0) indicates that S is winning (losing). Function v is usually re-
ferred to as a simple game. The diﬀerence v(S)¡v(S¡fig) is known as player i’s marginal
contribution to coalition S.
The most direct approach to measuring players’ power is to state a mapping ¹ – called
an index – from the space of simple games to Rn
+ together with a verbal story of why
¹i(v) indicates player i’s power in the considered class of decision bodies. But despite
the plausibility of some ‘stories’, their verbal form easily disguises incoherence or even
inconsistency. The axiomatic or property-based approach, in contrast, explicitly states a
set of mathematical properties fA1;:::;Akg that an index is supposed to have – together
with an (ideally unique) index ¹ which actually satisﬁes them. The requirements Aj are
usually referred to as axioms. A prominent example for the axiomatic approach is the
Shapley-Shubik index Á (cf. Shapley, 1953, and Shapley and Shubik, 1954). Though this
may not be immediately obvious, four properties A1–A4 imply that Ái(v) must be player i’s
weighted marginal contribution to all coalitions S, where weights are proportional to the
number of player orderings (j1;:::;i;:::;jn) such that S = fj1;:::;ig.10 Axioms can give a
clear reason of why Á and no other mapping is used – in particular, if a convincing story for
them is provided. A drawback of the axiomatic approach is, however, that axioms clarify
the tool with which one measures,11 but not what is measured based on which (behavioral
9Typically, one requires that the empty set is losing, the grand coalition N is winning, and any set
containing a winning coalition is also winning.
10The Shapley-Shubik index is characterized by the requirements that (A1) a (dummy) player who makes
no marginal contribution in v has index value 0, (A2) that the labelling of the players does not matter,
(A3) that players’ index values add up to 1, and (A4) that in the composition u _ v of two simple games
u and v, having the union of W(v) and W(v) as its set of winning coalitions W(u _ v), each player’s
power equals the sum of his power in u and his power in v minus his power in the game u^v obtained by
intersecting W(v) and W(u).
11Even this cannot be taken for granted. Axioms can be too general or mathematically complex to give
much insight.
4and institutional) assumptions about players and the decision body.
The probabilistic approach to the construction of power indices entails explicit assump-
tions about agents’ behavior together with an explicit deﬁnition of what is measured.
Agent behavior is speciﬁed as a probability distribution P for players’ acceptance rates,
denoting the probabilities of a ‘yes’-vote by individual players. A given player’s ex ante
power is then taken to be his probability of casting a decisive vote, i.e. to pass a proposal
that would not have passed had he voted ‘no’ instead of ‘yes’. Thus power is inferred from
the hypothetical consequences of an agent’s behavior. The object of analysis is with this
approach no longer described only by the set of winning coalitions or v, but also an explicit
model of (average) behavior.12 For example, the widely applied Penrose index (Penrose,
1946) – also known as the non-normalized Banzhaf index – is based on the distribution
assumption that each player independently votes ‘yes’ with probability 1/2 (on an unspec-
iﬁed proposal). The corresponding joint distribution of acceptance rates then deﬁnes the
index ¯ where ¯i(v) turns out to be, again, player i’s weighted marginal contribution to
all coalitions in v, where weight is this time equal to 1=2n¡1 for every coalition S µ N.13
Just as the direct approach and the axiomatic approach require stories to justify the
index ¹ or fA1;:::;Akg, respectively, the assumption of a particular distribution P of
acceptance rates has to be motivated. This points towards drawbacks of the probabilistic
index approach. First, the described behavior is usually not connected to any information
on the agents’ preferences or decision procedures.14 Second, decisions by individual players
are assumed to be stochastically independent. This will, in practice, only rarely be the
case since it is incompatible with negotiated coalition formation and voting based on stable
12Acceptance rates and assumptions on their stochastic relation among diﬀerent players can be inter-
preted as an implicit way of taking preferences into account in power index models (see Straﬃn, 1988, for
discussion).
13This means that ¯i(v) is the ratio of the number of swings that player i does have to the number of
swings that i could have. One can alternatively derive ¯ from the assumption that players’ acceptance
rates are independently distributed on [0;1] with mean 1/2.
14If such information is not available, the principle of insuﬃcient reason seems a valid argument for the
assumptions behind the Penrose index.
5player preferences. The imposition of stochastic or deterministic restrictions for coalitions
containing particular players or sub-coalitions can alleviate some of these shortcomings
of traditional indices (see van den Brink, 2001, or Napel and Widgr´ en, 2001). Still, the
application of traditional power indices has been severely criticized. Concerning decision-
making in the European Union, Garrett and Tsebelis (1999a, 1999b, and 2001) have taken
a particularly critical stance, pointing out indices’ ignorance of decision procedures and
player strategies.15
We agree with Garrett and Tsebelis that institutions and strategies have to be taken
into account by political analysis. Nevertheless, both the normative or constitutional ex
ante (possibly even a priori) analysis of political institutions and the positive or practical
political analysis of actual and expected decisions are valuable. It is legitimate to ask:
Which voting weights in the EU Council of Ministers would be equitable? For an answer,
countries’ special interests and their potentially unstable preferences in diﬀerent policy
dimensions should not matter. Hence they are best concealed behind a ‘veil of ignorance’ –
as accomplished by the Penrose index. When multi-level decision bodies are designed, the
objective of minimizing the probability for the referendum paradox (an upper-level decision
taken against a majority at a lower level) provides a similar case for a priori analysis. In
contrast, evaluation of the medium-run expected inﬂuence on EU policy from a particular
country’s point of view beneﬁts if available preference information is taken into account.16
Garrett and Tsebelis’s goal of “understanding ...policy changes on speciﬁc issues ...and
negotiations about treaty revisions” (Garrett and Tsebelis, 1999b, p. 332) or, in general,
“understanding decision-making in the EU” (Garrett and Tsebelis, 2001, p. 105) seems
impossible to achieve by looking only at the voting resources of diﬀerent EU members and
15See the replies of Berg and Lane (1999), Holler and Widgr´ en (1999), Steunenberg, Schmidtchen, and
Koboldt (1999), and Felsenthal and Machover (2001a).
16The ‘medium run’ can, of course, be short-lived: A social democratic Council member can quickly turn
into a right-wing conservative through elections. News about the ﬁrst national or another foreign outbreak
of mad-cow disease have quickly changed voters’ and a government’s views on agricultural, health, or trade
policy.
6the relevant qualiﬁed majority rule. The traditional power index approach is not a suitable
framework to discuss these positive questions related to power.
We disagree with Garrett and Tsebelis’ (2001) call for “a moratorium on the prolifer-
ation of index-based studies” (p. 100). As already pointed out by others, it is a matter of
taste whether one deems the pursuit of positive or normative analysis more worthwhile. We
believe in both and agree with Garrett and Tsebelis that the strategic implications, which
are hard to separate from players’ preferences, of particular institutional arrangements in
the EU and elsewhere have received too little attention so far. We think it desirable to
have a general uniﬁed framework which allows for positive and normative analysis, actual
political and constitutional investigations.
3 The Strategic Power Index of Steunenberg et al.
Replying to the critique by Garrett and Tsebelis, Steunenberg et al. (1999) have proposed
a framework originally believed to reconcile traditional power index analysis and analysis
of non-cooperative games, which explicitly describe agents’ choices in a political procedure
and (their beliefs about) agents’ preferences. They consider a spatial voting model with
n players and an m-dimensional outcome space. In our notation, let N = f1;:::;ng be
the set of players and X µ Rm be the outcome or policy space. Γ denotes the procedure
or game form describing the decision-making process and q 2 X describes the status quo
before the start of decision-making. Players are assumed to have Euclidean preferences
with ¸i 2 X (i 2 N) as player i’s ideal point. A particular combination of all players’ ideal
points and the status quo point deﬁne a ‘state of the world’ ». Assuming that it exists
and is unique, let x¤(») denote the equilibrium outcome of the game based on Γ and ».17
Steunenberg et al. are aware of Barry’s (1980) distinction between ‘power’ and ‘luck’ and
explicitly strive to isolate “the ability of a player to make a diﬀerence in the outcome”
(p. 362). They note that “[h]aving a preference that lies close to the equilibrium outcome
17Non-uniqueness may be accounted for by either equilibrium selection or, in ex ante analysis, explicit
assumptions about diﬀerent equilibria’s probability.
7of a particular game does not necessarily mean that this player is also ‘powerful’” (p. 345).
Therefore, they suggest to consider not one particular state of the world » but many.
In particular, one can consider each ¸i and the status quo q to be realizations of
random variables ˜ ¸i and ˜ q, respectively. If P denotes the joint distribution of random











gives the expected distance between the equilibrium outcome for decision procedure Γ and
player i’s ideal outcome. Steunenberg et al. “all other things being equal” consider “a player
::: more powerful than another player if the expected distance between the equilibrium
outcome and its ideal point is smaller than the expected distance for the other player”
(p. 348). In order to obtain not only a ranking of players but a cardinal measure of their
power, they proceed by considering a dummy player d – either already one of the players
or added to N – “whose preferences vary over the same range as the preferences of actual










The remainder of Steunenberg et al.’s paper is then dedicated to the detailed investiga-
tion of particular game forms Γ which model the consultation and cooperation procedures
of EU decision-making. They derive the subgame perfect equilibrium of the respective
policy game for any state of the world », and aggregate the distance between players’ ideal
outcome and the equilibrium outcome assuming independent uniform distributions over a
one-dimensional state space X for the ideal points and the status quo. The uniformity
assumption is not innocuous (see Garrett and Tsebelis, 2001, p. 101), but Steunenberg et
al.’s numerical calculations could quite easily be redone with more complex distribution
assumptions. The important question is: Does ΨΓ
i measure what it is claimed to, i.e. “the
ability of a player to make a diﬀerence in the outcome”?
The answer is: Only under very special circumstances. In particular, (1) turns out to
deﬁne ∆Γ
i to be player i’s expected success. Just like actual distance measures success (a
8function of luck and power), so does average distance measure average success. Unless one
regards average success as the deﬁning characteristic of power (which neither Steunenberg
et al. nor many others do), taking expectations will only by coincidence achieve what
Steunenberg et al. aim at, namely to “level out the eﬀect of ‘luck’ or a particular preference
conﬁguration on the outcome of a game” (p. 362). This point is discussed in considerable
detail in Napel and Widgr´ en (2002, pp. 9ﬀ). There, various examples illustrate that the
StPI is a good measure of expected success but in general fails to capture power;18 ΨΓ
i may
also become negative. Only for particular distribution assumptions is luck ‘levelled out’
by taking averages. Similarly, only under special conditions – which eliminate all strategic
aspects from the StPI – does a link between the StPI and Penrose index discovered by
Felsenthal and Machover (2001a) exist (see Napel and Widgr´ en, 2002, pp. 12f).
These points seem to have been taken. In particular, Steunenberg and Schmidtchen19
have proposed the incorporation of a distinct ‘dummy player’ (meaning a reference player
without decision rights) for each individual player. This solves some of the problems
discussed in Napel and Widgr´ en (2002), but not all.
18A non-technical example refers to a group of boys with a leader who makes proposals of what to do
in the afternoon (play football, watch a movie, etc.) which have to be accepted by simple majority. Boys’
preferences (mappings from the weather conditions, pocket money, etc.) are assumed to be identically but
independently distributed. The agenda setter enjoys smaller average distance to the equilibrium outcome
than the others; amongst the latter, expected distance is the same. Then, the little brother of the group’s
leader is allowed to participate in the group’s afternoon activity albeit without any say in selecting the
daily programme. He does not always agree with his elder brother’s most desired outcome, but does so
more often than the others (the brothers’ ideal points are positively correlated). Then, mean distance
between the group’s equilibrium activity and its new member’s most desired recreation is smaller – and
hence his StPI power value is larger – than that of the established members who actually have a vote on
the outcome.
19Presentation at the above-mentioned LSE Workshop.
94 An alternative approach
Steunenberg et al.’s original framework is suited to study success both ex post and, by
taking expectations, ex ante. The chief reason why the StPI does not measure power is its
reliance on information only about the outcome of strategic interaction. Power refers to
the ability to make a diﬀerence to something (which is implicitly regarded as subjectively
valuable to someone); a player’s power derives from – and needs to be measured by recurring
to – his available strategies in the considered decision procedure or game form. Power
means potential and thus refers to consequences of both actual and hypothetical actions.
In our view, the key to isolating a player’s power in the context of collective decision-
making is his marginal impact or his marginal contribution to the outcome x¤. As men-
tioned in section 2, this concept is well-established in the context of simple games and also
general cooperative games, where it measures the implication of some player i joining a
coalition S. The fundamental idea of comparing a given outcome with one or several other
outcomes, taking the considered player i’s behavior to be variable, amounts to analysis of
the sensitivity of the outcome with respect to player i’s actions. This can be generalized to
a non-cooperative setting which explicitly describes a decision procedure.
4.1 An Example
For illustration, consider the player set N[fbg, the rather restricted policy space X = f0;1g
embedded in R, and status quo ˜ q = 0. Let the decision procedure Γ be such that, ﬁrst,
bureaucrat b sets the agenda, i.e. either proposes 1 or ends the game and thereby conﬁrms
the status quo. Formally, he chooses an action ab from Ab = f1;qg. If a proposal is
made, then all players i 2 N simultaneously vote either ‘yes’, denoted by ai = 1, or ‘no’
(ai = 0). This makes Ai = f0;1g their respective set of actions. The proposal is accepted
if the weighted number of ‘yes’-votes meets a ﬁxed quota k, where the vote by player i is
10weighted by wi ¸ 0. Otherwise, the status quo prevails. Formally, the function









maps each action proﬁle a = (ab;a1;:::;an) to an outcome. Traditional power index
analysis for players i 2 N can easily be mimicked with this setting:20 Take
D
0
i(a) := x(ab;a1;:::;ai;:::;an) ¡ x(ab;a1;:::;0;:::;an) (2)
as player i’s marginal contribution for action proﬁle a – corresponding to v(S)¡v(S nfig)
for coalition S = fjjaj = 1g – and make probabilistic assumptions over the set of all
action proﬁles. The latter replaces the probability distribution over the set of all coalitions
which is usually considered via assumptions on acceptance rates. Assume, for example,











corresponds exactly to the traditional probabilistic measures obtained via Owen’s mul-






1=2n¡1; ab = 1
0; ab = 0;











; ab = 1
0; ab = 0;
it is the Shapley-Shubik index.
Economic and political actions are in most modern theoretical analyses regarded to be
the consequence of rational and strategic reasoning based on explicit preferences. There-
fore directly considering (probability distributions over) players’ action choices without
20Here we neglect the agenda setter b in order to stress the equivalence to traditional indices.
11recurring to the underlying preferences is methodologically somewhat unsatisfying.21 It is
usually not diﬃcult to ﬁnd (probability distributions over) preferences which rationalize
given behavior. In above example, one may e.g. assume that players i 2 N have random
spatial and procedural preferences with uniformly distributed ideal points ˜ ¸i taking values
in X and the procedural component that for given policy outcome x 2 X they prefer to
have voted truthfully.22 Let the bureaucrat have only a procedural preference, namely one
for putting up a proposal if and only if it is accepted.
Now consider a particular realization of ideal points ¸ = (¸1;:::;¸n). In the unique
equilibrium of this game, ﬁrst, the bureaucrat chooses ab = 1, i.e. he proposes 1, if and
only if the set Y := fij¸i = 1g meets the quota, i.e.
P
i2Y wi ¸ k. Second, every voter













maps all preference proﬁles (as determined by the vector of players’ ideal points) to a
unique equilibrium outcome. Assumptions about the distribution P 0 of random vector ˜ ¸ =
(˜ ¸1;:::; ˜ ¸n) can be stated such that P 0 induces the same distribution P over action proﬁles a
in equilibrium which has been directly assumed above. For example, P 0(¸1;:::;¸n) ´
1=2n¡1 implies equilibrium behavior which lets ¹Γ
i in (3) equal the Penrose index.
4.2 Measuring Ex Post Power
We propose to extend above analysis from the simple coalition framework typical of ex
ante power measurement and the very basic example voting game just considered to a
21It is a very convenient short-cut, however. Also note that models of boundedly rational agents who
do not optimize but apply heuristic rules of thumb receive more and more attention in the game-theoretic
literature (see e.g. Samuelson, 1997, Fudenberg and Levine, 1998, and Young, 1998).
22See Hansson (1996) on the importance of procedural preferences in the context of collective decision-
making. Our procedural preference assumption can e.g. be motivated by regarding each player as the
representative of a constituency to which he wants do demonstrate his active pursuit of its interests.
12more general setting. Player i’s marginal contribution is a measure for the sensitivity of
the outcome to player i’s behavior. We consider it the best available indicator of player i’s
potential or ability to make a diﬀerence for a given (expected or observed) collective deci-
sion, i.e. his ex post power. If this is of normative interest or for the lack of precise data,
one can calculate ex ante power based on ex post power as the latter’s expected value.
This equates ex ante power of player i with the expected sensitivity of the outcome to
i’s behavior. Expectations can be taken with respect to several diﬀerent aspects which
aﬀect ex post power such as actions, preferences, or the procedure. This allows for the
(re-)foundation of ex ante measures (including a priori indices) on a well-speciﬁed notion
of ex post power.
There are several – to us, at this stage, all promising – directions in which the notion
of ‘power as marginal impact’ or ‘power as sensitivity’ can be made precise. The uniting
theme is the identiﬁcation of the potential to inﬂuence an outcome of group decision-making
by looking at the sensitivity of that outcome with respect to the considered set of agents.
Inﬂuence can equally refer to the impact of a random ‘yes’ or ‘no’-decision, as assumed
by the traditional probabilistic index approach, and to the impact of a strategic ‘yes’ or
’no’-vote based on explicit preferences.
Crucially, ‘impact’ is always relative to a what-if scenario or what we would like to
call the shadow outcome. The shadow outcome is the group’s decision which would have
resulted if the player i whose power is under consideration had chosen (were to choose)
diﬀerently than he actually did (is expected to), e.g. if he had stayed out of coalition S when
he ex post belongs to it, or had ideal point 0 instead of 1. In simple games the diﬀerence
between shadow outcome and actual outcome, i.e. the sensitivity of the outcome to i’s
behavior for a given action proﬁle or coalition, is either 0 or 1. A richer decision framework
allows for more ﬁnely graded ex post power. It also requires a choice between several
candidates for the shadow outcome and, possibly, the subjective evaluation of diﬀerences.
A natural way to proceed is to measure player i’s ex post power as the diﬀerence in




n) also denoted by
(a¤
i;a¤









i. For preference-based actions with a
unique equilibrium a¤, this deﬁnes a player’s ex post power as the hypothetical impact of
a tremble in the spirit of Selten’s (1975) perfectness concept, i.e. of irrational behavior or
imperfect implementation of his preferred action. More generally, a tremble can refer to
just any deviation from reference behavior or reference preferences.
If Ai consists of more than two elements, diﬀerent degrees of irrationality or – if pref-
erences are left out of the picture – potential deviations from the observed action proﬁle
can be considered. In particular, one may conﬁne attention to the impact of a local action
tremble. If Ai = X = f0;±;2±;:::;1g for some ± > 0 that uniformly divides [0;1],23 a














i ¡ ± ¸ 0
0; otherwise.
(4)
If ± = 1, this corresponds exactly to D0
i(¢) and the marginal contribution deﬁned in the
traditional power index framework (see p. 11). As players’ choice set approaches the unit























Both (4) and (5) measure player i’s power in a given situation, described by the ex
post action vector a¤, as the (marginal) change of outcome which would be caused by a
small (or marginal) change of i’s action. It is, however, not necessary to take only small
















to deﬁne an alternative measure of ex post power.24 D1
i, D10
i , and D100
i are all based on the
question:
23This assumes that elements of X have a cardinal meaning. Clariﬁcation of the possibilities for extension
of our sensitivity analysis-framework to ordinal or nominal outcome spaces, as studied e.g. by Freixas and
Zwicker (2002), is left for future work.
14² If a player acted diﬀerently, would this alter the outcome of collective decision-making
and, if yes, by how much?
Making diﬀerent assumptions about which possible ‘diﬀerences’ in a player’s behavior are
relevant, they give a diﬀerent cardinal answer to this question.
Players’ preferences may enter (4)–(6) to deﬁne x¤(¸1;:::;¸n) ´ x(a¤) as the reference
point for action trembles, i.e. the point at which the (generalized) derivative of outcome
function x(¢) with respect to player i’s action is evaluated. If x¤(¸1;:::;¸n) is the unique
equilibrium outcome, any action deviation resulting in a distinct outcome is irrational.
A meaningful alternative to studying the potential damage or good that a player’s irra-
tionality could cause is to instead consider the eﬀect of variations in his preferences while
maintaining rationality. This refers to the following two criteria for ex post power as
sensitivity for given preferences:
² If a player wanted to, could he alter the outcome of collective decision-making?
² Would the change of outcome in magnitude (and direction) match the considered
change in preference?
Precise answers to these questions can be given by replacing x(a¤) by x¤(¸1;:::;¸n) in
above deﬁnitions. As in the case of hypothetical action changes, one may consider either
any conceivable change of preferences relative to some reference point or restrict attention
to slight variations. The latter requires some metric on preferences, which is, however,
naturally given for Euclidean preferences.
24The total range Dmax
i := maxa¡i2Xn¡1[maxai2X x(ai;a¡i) ¡ minai2X x(ai;a¡i)] of player i’s pos-
sible impact on outcome lacks any ex post character. It seems a reasonable a priori measure which
requires no distribution assumptions on ˜ a¤ or ˜ ¸. However, it is a rather coarse concept and would only






¡i) holds an interesting intermediate ground. Another promising pos-
sibility, suggested to us by Matthew Braham, is considering (the inverse of) the minimal tremble size by
which a player i would aﬀect a given outcome as a measure of his ex post power.





Figure 1: Equilibrium outcome of simple majority voting as ¸1 is varied
For illustration, consider players N = f1;2;3g with Euclidean preferences on policy
space X = [0;1], described by individual ideal points ¸i 2 X, and simple majority voting
on proposals made by the players. Let ¸(j) denote the j-th smallest of players’ ideal points,
i.e. ¸(1) · ¸(2) · ¸(3). Depending on the precise assumptions on the order of making
proposals and voting, many equilibrium proﬁles of player strategies exist. However, they
yield the median voter’s ideal point, ¸(2), as the unique equilibrium outcome x¤(¸1;¸2;¸3).
One can then investigate player 1’s power for given ¸2 and ¸3, where without loss of
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16is a measure of player 1’s power as a function of players’ ideal points in X based on local
preference trembles. According to D2
i(¢), player 1 is powerless (in the sense of not being
able to inﬂuence collective choice although he would like to do so after a small change
of preference) if he is not the median voter. For ¸1 2 (¸2;¸3), he has maximal power in
the sense that any (small) change in individual preference shifts the collective decision by
exactly the desired amount.
So far, we have only considered ideal points in one-dimensional policy spaces X. These
are analytically convenient.25 Both the derivation of ex post power and formation of
expectations are more complicated for higher-dimensional spaces. However, this is no
obstacle in principle.
To illustrate this, let Λ = (¸1;:::;¸n) be the collection of n players’ ideal points in Rm
(an m £ n matrix having as columns the ¸i-vectors representing individual players’ ideal
points).26 In a policy space X µ Rm, the opportunities even for only marginal changes of
preference are manifold. A given ideal point ¸i can locally be shifted to ¸i + ® where ®
is an arbitrary vector in Rm with small norm. It will depend which tremble directions are
particularly meaningful in applications.27 Multiples of the vector (1;1;:::;1) 2 Rm seem











deﬁnes a suitable measure of player i’s ex post power provided that above limit exists. This
is simply the directional derivative of the equilibrium outcome in direction ®. Alternatively,
25See Cooter (2002) on practical pros and cons of one-dimensional median democracy – asking for ‘yes’
or ‘no’-decisions on single issues, as widely used e.g. in Switzerland or California – in comparison with the
more dead-lock prone multi-dimensional bargain democracy.
26At the level of national elections, m = 2 is for most countries a suﬃciently ‘high’ dimension (Norman
Schoﬁeld, personal communication).
27For example, one may be interested in the expected eﬀect of a general swing towards economically
and/or socially more liberal or conservative positions across parties. One may also consider not a particular
direction ® but rather an entire neighborhood of ¸i (e.g. taking the supremum of (7) for all possible
directions ®).
17measures for the multidimensional case can be based on the gradient of x¤(¸i;¸¡i) (holding
¸¡i constant). In case of ideal points in a discrete policy space, a preference-based measure
D20
i (¸) can be deﬁned by replacing the derivative in (7) with a diﬀerence quotient in analogy
to (4) and (5). Another candidate for a meaningful ex ante (or even a priori) measure of












This is based on the consideration not only of small preference modiﬁcations but also of a
complete relocation of the player’s ideal outcome (see also fn. 24).
4.3 Calculating Ex Ante Power
Mappings D1
i, D2
i, and their discrete versions measure ex post power as the diﬀerence
between distinct shadow outcomes and the expected or observed (equilibrium) collective
decision. We do not want to discuss at this point which is the most relevant shadow outcome
and hence measure.28 All of them clearly distinguish power from the luck of a satisfying
group decision; they do not require any ‘averaging out’ of luck. Taking expectations merely
serves the purpose of obtaining ex ante conclusions if these are of interest.
Having selected a meaningful measure of ex post power, it is straightforward to deﬁne
a meaningful ex ante measure. It has to be based on explicit informational assumptions
concerning players’ preferences or – if one does not want to assume preference-driven
behavior – actions. Denoting by ˜ » the random state of the world as given either by










i (a¤) and D2
00
i (¸) produce identical power indications if each action can be a player’s
most preferred one.
18Traditional power indices, such as the Penrose or Shapley-Shubik index, consider the
particularly simple decision procedure in which players i 2 N = f1;:::;ng choose an action
ai 2 Ai = f0;1g and the outcome of decision-making, x(a), is 1 if set Y := fij¸i = 1g
is a winning coalition, i.e. if v(Y ) = 1, and 0 otherwise. They use D0
i(a) (or D1
i(a) with
± = 1). The StPI proposed by Steunenberg et al., too, is a linear transform of (9), albeit
using the unreasonable a posteriori power measure Di(˜ ») =
°
°




Let us illustrate our sensitivity analysis approach to measuring power more explicitly.
As an example assume a simple procedural spatial voting game where a ﬁxed agenda setter
makes a ‘take it or leave it’ oﬀer to a group of 5 voters and needs 4 sequentially cast votes
to pass it.30 The policy space is X = [0;1], voters’ ideal points are ¸1;:::;¸5, that of the
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0; otherwise.
29We have omitted a sub- or superscript Γ in the deﬁnition of ex post measures for a concise notation.
The procedure is, however, the central determinant of outcome functions x(¢) or x¤(¢). If several diﬀerent
game forms Γ 2 G are to be considered ex ante, one has to take expectation over ¹Γ
i with the appropriate
probability measure on G.
30This setting has occasionally been used in the literature as the simplest one allowing to compare the
eﬀects of simple majority, qualiﬁed majority, and unanimity rules.
19Based on this, one can derive ex ante strategic power measures ¹Γ
j and ¹Γ
i for the
















where f¾ and f¸(2) are the densities of the independent random variables ¾ and ¸(2), re-







































which is the product of the probability 0.075 of player i having a swing that matters to
the outcome and ex post power D2
i(¾;¸) = 2 for these preference conﬁgurations. This
means that ex ante a shift of the agenda setter’s ideal point ¾ (voter i’s ideal point ¸i) by
one marginal unit will induce an expected shift of the outcome by 0.625 units (0.15 units).
So the agenda setter’s leverage and inﬂuence on the outcome are ex ante more than four
times larger than that of any given voter. One may want to compare agenda setting power
to the power of the complete council consisting of all ﬁve voters. This can be done by
considering self-enforcing agreements among council members before actual voting, hence












2f¾(x)f¸(2)(y)dy dx = 0:75;
i.e. the council-of-ﬁve has ex ante slightly more power in aggregate than the agenda setter.
205 Final Remarks
For more complex and more realistic assumptions about preferences and procedures, the
proposed two-step sensitivity approach to measurement of power remains valid. The only
diﬀerence to our simple illustrations is that the calculations for preference-driven strategic
behavior – i.e. determination of the equilibrium outcome as a function of parameterized
preferences, its derivative with respect to players’ preference parameters, and expected
values – will be more complicated if e.g. ideal points are not uniformly distributed or for
complex bargaining protocols. This is not a big problem if one does not insist on closed
analytical solutions, but is primarily concerned with numerical values. In particular, Monte
Carlo simulation allows to approximate the required probabilities and expectations with
arbitrary precision even of complicated voting bodies.
We have above deﬁned ex post power as the objective marginal impact which a player’s
action or underlying preference has on the outcome of collective decision-making. It is
possible to go one step further. Namely, we have in passing hinted at the opportunity to
understand – and measure – power as a subjective concept.
Consider a multi-dimensional policy space. Let the decision procedure give player i
dictator power in some dimension di and but no say in all other dimensions. The opportu-
nity to deﬁne the collective decision in this dimension could be all that player i cares for.
Then, judged in terms of his own preferences he has maximal power. The other players
may be completely indiﬀerent towards their joint decision’s component in dimension di.
Judged in terms of their preferences, i is a dummy who can never have an impact on their
well-being. Alternatively, player i can hold dictator power on a dimension he does not care
about (e.g. to pardon an unknown convict sentenced to death), but which is all-important
to some, perhaps not all, other players. Player i is powerful depending on one’s view-point,
i.e. preferences.31
31This assumes that there is no (perfect) ‘market for inﬂuence’ which would imply that – after all gains
from exchange of direct inﬂuence are realized – each player i’s power generically depends on all players’
preferences but is the same as judged by any player j (see Coleman, 1966).
21Given the often entirely personal evaluation of power in real life, it seems worthwhile
to study the subjective sensitivity of outcomes to players’ actions or preferences. It is
straightforward to replace the derivative of outcome function x¤(¢) in above deﬁnitions by
the derivative of players’ utility of outcome, ui(x¤(¢)), taken with respect to their own and
other players’ parameterized actions or preferences. A player’s power is then not simply a
real number, but a vector of subjective evaluations of it by all players (including himself).
The corresponding index function is matrix-valued.
Subjective evaluation of players’ power may be meaningless in the context of normative
analysis of constitutional designs. However, it seems relevant for positive analysis, and is
arguably the most relevant aspect to participants when decision procedures, e.g. in the
EU or the WTO, are the object of multilateral negotiations.
Scholars of equilibrium-based ex post analysis and those favoring axiomatic ex ante
or a priori analysis will possibly not see an urgent need to merge their ﬁelds. However,
the suggested uniﬁed approach should clarify that they are not as far apart as it may
seem. The axiomatic camp has been very little concerned with the notion of ex post power
which is implicitly underlying their indices. Its members have leaped from an abstractly
deﬁned voting body to individual (ex ante or a priori) power values – without specifying
how agents can and do (inter-)act and investigating which ex post power is associated
with this. The non-cooperative camp has been interested almost entirely in equilibrium
behavior and its consequences for individual success. If the latter’s attention is extended
from success to power, which in case of subjective evaluations is the derivative of success,
and if the former’s large jump is decomposed into two smaller steps, the work of both
methodological camps turns out to neatly complement each other.
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